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"SO IT WILL BE FOUND THAT THE RIGHT OF
WOMEN IN MANY CASES IS OF DIMINISHED
CONDITION": RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL
EQUALITY OF MEN AND WOMEN IN
TWELFTH AND THIRTEENTH-CENTURY
CANON LAW
Charles J Reid, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1792 Mary Wollstonecraft used the expression "rights of
women" as a means of criticizing the men who led the French
Revolution for failing to advance the cause of women's equality.'
Finding fault with the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen for its exclusion of women from an active voice in the
governance of the state, Wollstonecraft used the category of rights to
argue for the political equality of the sexes: "Consider... whether,
when men contend for their freedom, and to be allowed to judge for
themselves respecting their own happiness, it be not inconsistent and
unjust to subjugate women." 2  Women, as much as men,
Wollstonecraft argued, should be educated in the civic virtues and
* Research Associate in Law and History and Lecturer in Law, Emory
University. Thanks to Anita Bernstein, Kathleen Brady, William J. Carney,
George Conklin, Martha Grace Duncan, and John Witte, Jr., for their helpful
advice and comments. I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of
Gerard M. Reid, January 19, 1957 to October 30, 1999.
1. See JANET TODD, MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT: A REVOLUTIONARY LIFE
176-87 (2000); MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN 7-11 (Everyman's Library 1992) (1792).
2. WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 1, at 9.
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allowed an equal say in the governance of the realm.3 Anything less
opened one up to "the charge of injustice and inconsistency.
' 4
The term "rights of women," and its use as an analytical tool,
would seem to be a distinctively modem creation, born of the
upheavals of the French Revolution and the loosening of the bonds
of traditional society. On the contrary, as this Article will
demonstrate, the term "right of women" (ius mulierum) was already
a term identifiable in the work of a leading thirteenth-century canon
lawyer, Cardinal Hostiensis (c. 1200-1271). 5 The idea of rights
pertaining to both sexes, indeed, had already become, by the mid-
thirteenth century, an important means of analyzing the law
governing the marital relationship.
To say this does not make the canonists protoliberals. In most
respects, they believed in a strong hierarchical order, in which
women were to be subordinated to men.6 But the canonists, it is now
well-established, also made consistent use of a rights-vocabulary and
were capable, when circumstances so warranted, of applying that
vocabulary to the legal status of women. At times, their analysis
recognized a legal equality between the sexes. More often, it did not.
But it is the interaction of a hierarchical world view, on the one hand,
with notions of rights and equality, on the other, that is the subject of
this study. The purpose of this Article is neither to laud nor condemn
the canonists, but rather to attempt to understand their treatment of
the ius mulierum (right of women) and to assess its historical place in
the development of the Western rights tradition.
3. See Maria J. Falco, Introduction: Who Was Mary Wollstonecraft?, in
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT 1, 3 (Maria J. Falco
ed., 1996) ("Wollstonecraft maintained that women should be educated to
support themselves, with or without marriage, and that they should have the
right to pursue the same professions as men-medicine, business, law-and
even that they should be represented in Parliament.").
4. WOLLSTONECRAFT, supra note 1, at 9.
5. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
6. See Eleanor Commo McLaughlin, Equality of Souls, Inequality of
Sexes: Woman in Medieval Theology, in RELIGION AND SEXISM: IMAGES OF
WOMAN IN THE JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN TRADITIONS 213 (Rosemary Radford
Reuther ed., 1974). See generally KARI ELISABETH BORRESEN,
SUBORDINATION AND EQUIVALENCE: THE NATURE AND ROLE OF WOMEN IN
AUGUSTINE AND THOMAS AQUINAS (Charles H. Talbot trans., Univ. Press of
Am. 1981) (1968) (discussing areas of inequality and equality of the sexes in
the works of Augustine and Thomas Acquinas).
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The canon law of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was a
highly refined system of jurisprudence and the cornerstone of the
Western legal tradition.7 Shaped and forged in the papal revolution
of the twelfth century,8 the canon law of the period from 1140 to
roughly 1375 has come to be known as the law's "classic age." 9 In
Western Europe where the church assumed broad jurisdictional
responsibilities over such matters as marriage and the family, ° wills
and estates," warfare among princes, 12 the enforcement of
contracts, 13 and many other matters which one might now think of as
purely secular matters, canon law assumed an urgent vitality. Its
practitioners were "princes of the law" and formed a transnational
7. See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of canon law during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries).
8. Seeid. at85-119.
9. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 44-69 (David Bates
ed., 1995); R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW xiii (Alan
Watson ed., 1996).
10. See R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
(D.E.C. Yale ed., 1974); JOHN WrrrE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT:
MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 30-32 (Don S.
Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997).
11. See generally BRIAN EDWIN FERME, CANON LAW IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND: A STUDY OF WILLIAM LYNWOOD'S PROVINCIALE WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO TESTAMENTARY LAW (1996) (providing a careful
study of testamentary law in late medieval England); JEROME DANIEL
HANNAN, THE CANON LAW OF WILLS: AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS AND
COMMENTARY (1934) (providing a conspectus of the historical evolution of
wills and testaments in canon law); MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE CONVERSION OF THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE
END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY (1963) (offering an analysis of the
development of wills to the end of high Middle Ages).
12. See GEORGE MINOIS, L'EGLISE ET LA GUERRE: DE LA BIBLE A L'tRE
ATOMIQUE [THE CHURCH AND WAR: FROM THE BIBLE TO THE ATOMIC AGE]
131-207 (1994); FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES
86-212 (Walter Ullmann ed., 2d prtg. 1977); James A. Brundage, The Limits of
the War-Making Power: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists, in
PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER IN PERSPECTIVE
69, 69-85 (Charles J. Reid, Jr. ed., 1986).
13. See generally JULES ROUSSIER, LE FONDEMENT DE L'OBLIGATION
CONTRACTUELLE DANS LE DROT CLASSIQUE DE L'EGLISE [THE FOUNDATION
OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION IN THE CLASSIC LAW OF THE CHURCH] (1933)
(exploring the foundations of canonistic contract doctrine and its application in
the courts of canon law).
474 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 35:471
elite who shared a common language, a common set of legal
principles, and a common outlook.14
The classic age can roughly be divided into two periods. The
first stretches from 1140 to 1215 and can be called the "age of the
decretists." This period commenced with the appearance of a
compendious work on canon law edited by a mysterious figure
known as Gratian.15  Known originally as the Concordia
discordantium canonum (Harmony of discordant canons), the work
came quickly to be known by its abbreviated title "Decretum," or
"decree."' 16 This work synthesized and harmonized one thousand
years of sometimes conflicting papal pronouncements, conciliar
decrees, and teachings of leading church fathers, such as St.
Augustine, St. Jerome, and Isidore of Seville. 17 In its depth and
thoroughness it was totally original in the history of the church.
The decretists, then, were commentators on Gratian's Decretum.
In their work, they sought both to resolve questions left implicit in
Gratian's analysis and to fill in gaps left open in Gratian's text.
18
Many decretists made profoundly important contributions to the
development of Western law, though they are barely known today
outside of specialist circles. For instance, Rufinus, who wrote
around the year 1160, made important contributions to the
development of the Western rights vocabulary. 19 Also, another
14. See James A. Brundage, The Rise of Professional Canonists and the
Development of the Jus Commune, 112 ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG
FOR RECHTSGESCHICHTE (Kan. Abt.) 26, 54-55 (1995); James A. Brundage,
The Rise of the Professional Jurist in the Thirteenth Century, 20 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 185, 188 (1994).
15. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN's DECRETUM 5-18
(D.E. Luscombe et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the composition of Gratian's
Decretum); John T. Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of
the Father of the Systematic Study of Canon Law, 35 TRADITio 145, 158-61
(1979) (reviewing the available evidence on Gratian's life).
16. See STEPHAN G. KUTTNER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN
INTERPRETATION OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 10 (1960).
17. See Stephan Kuttner, The Father of the Science of Canon Law, 1 JURIST
2, 4-5, 15 (1941); see also John T. Noonan, Jr., Catholic Law School-A.D.
1150, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1189 (1998) (analyzing Gratian's dialectical
method and its influence on Catholic law schools).
18. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western
Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37, 43 (1991).
19. See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON
NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 1150-1625, at 62-63
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leading decretist, Huguccio, who was active in the 1180s, made
indispensable contributions to the development of Western
constitutional structures.20 Johannes Teutonicus, the last great writer
of this movement and the author of the Ordinary Gloss-the
standard commentary which was copied together with the text
itself-flourished in the years 1210 and 1218.21
The second period runs from 1215 to 1370 and can be termed
the "period of the decretalists." Decretalists were so-called because
of their role as commentators on the new flood of papal decretal
letters in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These decretal letters,
often quite detailed in their prescriptions, resembled judicial
pronouncements in that they usually responded to cases or
controversies, but also resembled legislation in the way in which
they laid down rules to govern future conduct. 22 These decretals
were gradually put into collections, informally at first, and then in
officially promulgated documents.23 The most important of these
collections in the thirteenth century was that known as Liber extra,
edited by the Spanish Dominican Raymond of Pefiafort, and
promulgated by Pope Gregory IX in 1234.24
These decretal collections, and especially Liber extra, developed
their own band of commentators in the course of the thirteenth
century. Three in particular stand out: (1) Henry of Susa, who as
cardinal-bishop came to be known as Hostiensis, flourished from the
1240s to 1271, and wrote both a Summa organizing and explicating
the law, and a Lectura commenting on the individual decretals of
Liber extra;25 (2) Sinibaldo dei Fieschi, who reigned as Pope
(John Witte, Jr. ed., 1997).
20. See WOLFGANG P. MULLER, HUGUCCIO: THE LIFE, WORKS, AND
THOUGHT OF A TWELFTH-CENTURY JURIST 136-51 (Kenneth Pennington et al.
eds., 1994).
21. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 9, at 219-20.
22. See Charles Donahue, Jr., Roman Canon Law in the Medieval English
Church: Stubbs vs. Maitland Re-examined After 75 Years in the Light of Some
Records from the Church Courts, 72 MICH. L. REv. 647, 680-99 (1974)
(discussing the similarities of papal decretals to both case law and legislation);
see also Reid, supra note 18, at 43-44 (discussing further the similarities of
papal decretals to legislation and judicial decisions).
23. See HELMHOLZ, supra note 9, at 10-12.
24. See id. at 12-14.
25. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 9, at 214 (providing biographical details of
Hostiensis's Lectura on the Liber extra).
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Innocent IV from 1243 to 1254 and authored a commentary on Liber
extra in his spare moments as pope, and has been called by F.W.
Maitland "the greatest lawyer that ever sat upon the chair of St.
Peter;, 2 6 and (3) Bernard of Parma (d. 1266), who taught for most of
his career at the University of Bologna, where he authored the
ordinary gloss on the Liber extra.
27
This article will focus primarily on the treatment these three
leading canonists and a few others accorded the idea of the right of
women (ius mulierum). For the most part, the canonists insisted that
women occupied an inferior status. They suffered from a number of
legal disabilities and lacked many of the rights and powers that
belonged to men.28 But the canonists recognized an equality of
rights in three areas: women, like men, were free to choose the place
of their burial; women, like men, were free to contract marriage with
the partner of their choice; and finally, women were equally free,
within marriage, to demand satisfaction of the conjugal debt.
II. THE RIGHT OF CHRISTIAN BURIAL
"So it will be found that the right of women in many cases is of
diminished condition." 29 When Hostiensis wrote this passage, he
may well have had in mind a passage of Azo, a teacher of Roman
law at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Azo wrote that "men
and women differ in many respects, because the legal condition of
women is less than men., 30 Azo proceeded to list a variety of ways
in which women were of diminished capacity: they might not
exercise jurisdiction, judgment, guardianship, or a variety of other
rights or powers. 31 Furthermore, Azo was not original in making his
26. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in
3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, DOWNING
PROFESSOR OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 304, 310 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911); see
BRUNDAGE, supra note 9, at 225-26.
27. See BRUJNDAGE, supra note 9, at 210 (providing biographical details).
28. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist
Stereotypes in Contemporary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1135,
1151-59 (1990).
29. HOsTIENsIs, LECTURA X 3.26.18 v. masculis ("Sic ert deterioris
conditionis ius mulierum quod et in multis casibus est reperire.").
30. See SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON AND AZO 60
(Frederic William Maitland ed., 1895) ("et differunt feminae a 'masculis in
multis, quia feminarum est condicio deterior 'quam masculorum'...
31. See id.
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observation about the status of women. His acknowledged source
was the classical Roman jurist Papinian, who wrote that "in many
articles of our law the condition of women is inferior to that of
men."
32
Hostiensis, however, moved significantly beyond his sources.
Where Azo and Papinian spoke in objective terms, referring simply
to the juridic condition of women, or the law pertaining to women,
Hostiensis spoke in terms of subjective rights-the ius mulierum,
best translated as "the right of women."
An older school of thought has maintained that the canonists of
this time did not possess a concept of rights, although this view has
now been effectively refuted.33 But even if one accepts that the
canonists did make use of a rights-based vocabulary, it is still jarring
to encounter a term like ius mulierum. The term was, nevertheless, a
tool that a creative canonist like Hostiensis was ready to deploy in
order to analyze areas of both legal equality and inequality.
34
There were, as noted, three large areas where the canon law of
the thirteenth century recognized legal equality between men and
women. Burial, the first of the three areas to be considered, was not
viewed in the middle ages as merely the disposal of dead bodies no
longer part of the community.35 Death and the disposition of the
dead formed an integral part of communal existence that was closely
connected to the central Christian belief in the resurrection of the
dead and the transcendence of death itself at the time of the last
judgment.
36
32. DIG. 1.5.9 (Papinian, Quaestionum 31) ("In multis iuris nostri articulis
deterior est condicio feminarum quam masculorum.").
33. See TIERNEY, supra note 19, at 13-42; Reid, supra note 18, at 46-59.
34. Indeed, at the point where Hostiensis observed that the ius mulierwn
was frequently inferior to that of men, he wished to note that in at least one
respect-the age at which young men and women could be released by the
emperor to administer the estates of their fathers or grandfathers-women
were at an advantage with respect to men. Their ius was melioris (better)
because they could petition for such a release at eighteen, while men had to
wait to age twenty. See CODE JUST. 2.44.2 (Constantine, 321) (the text upon
which Hostiensis was commenting).
35. See generally Bruce Gordon & Peter Marshall, Introduction: Placing
the Dead in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, in THE PLACE OF THE
DEAD: DEATH AND REMEMBRANCE IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 1, 1-9 (Bruce Gordon & Peter Marshall eds., 2000) (introducing a
collection of essays exploring the role of the dead in medieval Europe).
36. See PATRICK J. GEARY, LIVING WITH THE DEAD IN THE MIDDLE AGES
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The centrality of the Christian belief in resurrection was a new
development in the Greco-Roman world of the first century C.E.
Much of the pagan environment in which Christianity took root
around the Mediterranean basin rejected the idea of an afterlife.37
For example, pagan tomb inscriptions often ironically celebrated the
eternal non existence of their occupants. 38 Pliny the Elder, the first-
century encyclopedist, declared that "[a]ll men are in the same state
from their last day onward as they were before their first day, and
neither body nor mind possesses any sensation after death, any more
than it did before birth ....
Similarly, Jewish theology of the fifth and sixth centuries B.C.E.
lacked a well-formed conception of an afterlife. The Old Testament
word for the world of the spirits is sheol, and it connotes darkness,
chaos, and desolation.40  The dead do not cease to exist, but are
forsaken, abandoned, and cut off from God's care.4 1 However, a few
biblical texts promise a more hopeful future. Isaiah speaks of the
corpses of the righteous dead who shall arise and sing,42 and Ezekiel
prophesies that "I will open your graves and have you rise from
them, and bring you back to the land of Israel.' 43  The Book of
Daniel promises that "[m]any of those who sleep in the dust of the
earth shall awake...."44
Christianity, however, with its belief in a savior who rose from
the dead following his execution by Roman authority, made belief in
1-3 (1994); Natalie Zemon Davis, Some Tasks and Themes in the Study of
Popular Religion, in THE PURSUIT OF HOLINESS IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND
RENAISSANCE RELIGION 307, 326-28 (Charles Trinkaus & Heiko A. Oberman
eds., 1974).
37. See ALFRED C. RUSH, DEATH AND BURIAL IN CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY 7
(Johannes Quasten ed., 1941) ("Death, for the pagan, often signified the final
and irremediable episode of life beyond which nothing was known and nothing
was to be looked for.").
38. One inscription reads: "I was not, I am. I shall not be. It causes me no
pain." ["Non fui et so non ero non mihi dolet."]. Id. at 10 & n.54. Another
declares: "Here I am, and I am not." ["Hic so et non so."]. Id. at 10 & n.55.
39. PLINY, NATURAL HISTORY Lib. 7, 55.188 (H. Rackham trans., 1938).
40. See NICHOLAS J. TROMP, PRIMITIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DEATH AND THE
NETHER WORLD IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 21-23 (1969).
41. See Psalms 87:4-5.
42. See Isaiah 26:19.
43. Ezekiel 37:12 (Saint Joseph New Catholic Edition).
44. Daniel 12:2 (Saint Joseph New Catholic Edition).
January 2002] RIGHTS AND EQUALITY IN CANON LAW 479
the resurrection of the dead a central part of its teaching.45 Jesus'
miraculous powers included the power to raise the dead,46 and his
closest followers, Peter and Paul, shared in this power.47 A powerful
commitment to the idea of the resurrection of the body permeated
early Christian texts and shaped the way burial itself was
conceptualized.48  Gradually, Jewish and Roman burial practices
came to be "Christianized" and a powerful new set of beliefs and
practices concerning the proper disposition of the dead arose.4 9 By
the third century one sees the Greek word koimeterion (sleeping
place or dormitory)50 used to describe the resting place of Christians.
Transliterated into Latin as coemeterium, this term has become the
modem "cemetery." 5' Christian cemeteries were seen as a place of
sleep for the dead until the Second Coming and became the site of
important liturgical events, such as celebrations of the Eucharist.
52
Early Christian theologians emphasized the role of the
resurrection in their discussion of the proper care to be shown for the
dead. Thus, Prudentius wrote that Christian funerals were elaborate
affairs because the bodies laid to rest contained immortal souls and
45. See C.F. EVANS, RESURRECTION AND THENEW TESTAMENT 1-3 (1970).
46. See John 4:46-54 (Jesus cures the son of a royal official); Id. at 11:1-44
(Jesus raises Lazarus from the dead); Matthew 27:51-53 (tombs open upon
Jesus' death and the bodies of the saints who had fallen asleep enter
Jerusalem). Jesus raises Jairus' daughter from the dead. See Matthew 9:18-26;
Mark 5:21-43; Luke 8:40-56.
47. See Acts 9:36-42 (Peter raises Tabitha from the dead); Id. at 20:7-12
(Paul raises Eutychus from the dead).
48. See generally JOANNE E. MCWILLIAM DEWART, DEATH AND
RESURRECTION (Thomas Halton ed., 1986) (exploring early Christian writing
on the dead and the life of the world to come).
49. See FREDERICK S. PAXTON, CHRISTIANIZING DEATH: THE CREATION OF
A RITUAL PROCESS IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 19-27 (1990).
50. See HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH
LEXICON 968 (9th ed. 1958).
51. See 3 DICTIONNAIRE D'ARCHIEOLOGIE CHRTIENNE ET DE LITURGIE
1625 (Femand Cabrol & Henri Leclercq eds., 1948); A DICTIONARY OF
CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITIES 329 (William Smith & Samuel Cheetham eds., Kraus
Reprint Co. 1968) (1880).
52. Thus the Didascalia Apostolorum, a third century legal text associated
with the City of Antioch, exhorted believers to celebrate the Eucharist "both in
your congregations and in your cemeteries.. . ." DIDASCALIA APOSTOLORUM:
THE SYRIAC VERSION TRANSLATED AND ACCOMPANIED BY THE VERONA
LATIN FRAGMENTS 252 (Oxford University Press 1929).
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will rise again on the last day.53 Similarly, St. Augustine stressed
that while funerals did not benefit the dead, whom God would raise
up again regardless whether they were buried, they were
opportunities for the living to show respect for the deceased and to
fulfill their natural duties in this world.54
From an early date, Christian burial places were integrated into
the devotional practices of the larger Christian community. The
practice of burial ad sanctos (burial within the church at the side of
the saints) grew up in the fifth and sixth centuries as a means of
seeking the intervention of the anointed of God at the time of
judgment.55  Those who could not be buried at the side of the
saints-that is, the great bulk of the Christian community-came to
be buried in the yard surrounding the parish church. By the eleventh
century "[t]he church and its cemetery are regarded as a unity in
Christian practice."
56
During these early centuries of church history, in a development
parallel to the growth of Christian burial practice, there developed a
theology of Christian marriage that emphasized the enduring unity of
the couple. 57 Male and female were made one flesh at the time of
coupling, 58 and neither party was thereafter free to shatter this
unity.59 The unity was not perfect. It did not endure into the next
life. In the next life, they neither marry nor are given in marriage.
60
Thus, a widowed spouse might be free to remarry, although the more
53. See 1 PRUDENTIUS 87-89 (H.J. Thomson trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1962) (1949).
54. See YVETrE DUVAL, AUPRPS DES SAINTS CORPS ET AME:
L'INHUMATION 'AD SANCTOS' DANS LA CHRETIENTE D'ORIENT ET D'OCCIDENT
DU IIIE AU VIIE SItCLE [AT THE SIDE OF THE SAINTS, BODY AND SOUL:
BURIAL 'AD SANCTOS' IN THE CHRISTIAN EAST AND WEST FROM THE THIRD
TO THE SEVENTH CENTURIES] 3-11 (1988).
55. See Donald Bullough, Burial, Community and Belief in the Early
Medieval West, in IDEAL AND REALITY IN FRANKISH AND ANGLO-SAXON
SOCIETY 177, 179 (Patrick Wormald et al. eds., 1983).
56. Lawrence Butler, The Churchyard in Eastern England, AD 900-1100:
Some Lines of Development, in ANGLO-SAXON CEMETERIES 383, 383 (Philip
Rahtz et al. eds., 1980).
57. See WITTE, supra note 10, at 19-22.
58. See Matthew 19:5-6.
59. See PHILIP LYNDON REYNOLDS, MARRIAGE IN THE WESTERN CHURCH:
THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF MARRIAGE DURING THE PATRISTIC AND EARLY
MEDIEVAL PERIODS 335-37 (J. Den Boeft et al. eds., 1994).
60. See Luke 20:34-36 (Saint Joseph New Catholic Edition).
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praiseworthy course of action might be a life of consecrated chastity
or some other form of spiritual pursuit.61 But for terrestrially bound
couples, it was not possible for a legally married spouse to escape the
bond of marriage.
62
The law as found at the dawn of the second millenium, invoking
the essential oneness of married couples, asserted the obligation of
the woman to follow her husband in choice of burial place.
Burchard, bishop of Worms in the first quarter of the eleventh
century and compiler of an encyclopedic collection of canons
representing the practice of the early medieval church,63 included
four texts admonishing wives to be buried in the same tombs as their
husbands.64  A passage of St. Jerome noted that the three great
patriarchs-Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob-were all buried with their
wives, as was Adam with Eve.65 In the excerpt reproduced by
Burchard, Jerome next turned to the Book of Tobias for support,
noting that Tobias counseled his son to bury his wife next to him,
since they had spent their lives together.66 A second excerpt from
Jerome asserted that "those who were joined together in life should
be joined together in a single tomb, because they have become one
flesh and what God has joined together, man should not separate."
67
61. See MICHEL PARISSE, Des veuves au monast~re, in VEUVES ET
VEUVAGE: DANS LE HAUT MOYEN AGE [WIDOWS AND WIDOWHOOD IN THE
HIGH MIDDLE AGES] 255, 255-74 (1993); JOCELYN WOGAN-BROWNE,
SAINTS' LIVES AND WOMEN'S LITERARY CULTURE, C.1150-1300: VIRGNITY
AND ITS AUTHORIZATIONS 46-48 (2001).
62. See REYNOLDS, supra note 59, at 177-78 (reciting the doctrine that
adultery is the only valid grounds for divorce).
63. See BRIAN EDWIN FERME, INTRODUZIONE ALLA STORIA DELLE FONTI
DEL DIRTTO CANONICO [INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE SOURCES OF
CANON LAW] 157 (1998); LOTrE KRY, CANONICAL COLLECTIONS OF TIE
EARLY MIDDLE AGES (CA. 400-1140): A BmLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE TO THE
MANUSCRIPTS AND LITERATURE 133-55 (Wilfried Hartmann & Kenneth
Pennington eds., 1999).
64. See BURCHARD VON WORMS, DECRETORUM LIBRI XX Lib. 3, cc.160-
63 [hereinafter BURCHARD].
65. See id. at c.160 (relying upon St. Jerome, Liber de situ et nominibus:
locorun hebraicorum, 23 PATROLOGIA LATINA 904, 906 (1883)).
66. See id.; Tobias 4:5. St. Jerome's discussion of the Book of Tobias is no
longer preserved in the corpus of his work, although medieval legal texts cite
to it and discuss it. See 1 CORPUS IUPIS CANONICI 721 n.23 (Aemilius
Friedberg ed., 1955) (1879).
67. BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c.161 ("Quos coniunxit unum coniugium,
coniungat unum sepulchrum. Quia una caro est, et quod Deus coniunxit, homo
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These passages were followed by an excerpt from St. Augustine
noting that "a woman should follow her husband, whether in life or
in death., 68 Rounding out the four excerpts was a passage from
Gregory the Great noting that St. Benedict and his sister, St.
Scholastica, who had chosen to follow the monastic vocation like her
brother, should become one and the same flesh in a single tomb since
they had been of one mind in the Lord.69 In his rubric, Burchard
generalized: "Those who are of one mind, burial should not
separate.
70
As evidenced by hagiography, Burchard of Worms's teaching
represented the social ideal toward which persons were expected to
strive in the early Middle Ages. The story of St. Ida of Herzfeld, a
ninth-century holy woman, provides an example of the sort of
devotion expected of wives who survived their husbands. 71 St. Ida
was a young noble woman who fell in love with Count Egbert,
whom she married after nursing him back to health.72 Following
Egbert's death, Ida built a chapel in his memory and dedicated
non separet."). This passage no longer appears to be extant in Jerome's work,
but is preserved by the legal tradition. See 1 CoRPUS IURIs CANONICI, supra
note 66, at 721 n.23.
68. BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c.162 ("Unaquaeque mulier sequatur
virum suum, sive in vita, sive in morte.").
69. See id. at c.163. "Soror sancti Benedicti sepulta est in sepulchro quod
ipse sibi praeparaverat, ut quorum mens una semper fuit in domino, eorum
quoque corpora sepultura non separaret. Ita in primo connubio coniuncti, quia
una et eadem caro est, in uno sepulchro sepeliantur." [The sister of St.
Benedict was buried in the tomb he had prepared for himself, so that their
minds, always one in the Lord, as well as their bodies, the grave should not
separate. So those joined in a first marriage, because they are one and the
same flesh, should be buried in one tomb] I GREGORY THE GREAT,
DIALOGUES Lib. 1, c.34 (1978); see also T.F. LINDSAY, SAINT BENEDICT: HIS
LIFE AND WORK 173-85 (1949) (discussing the relationship of St. Benedict and
St. Scholastica); JUSTIN MCCANN, SAINT BENEDICT 43-45, 210-12 (1979)
(providing further details concerning the relationship of Gregory and St.
Scholastica).
70. BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c.163 ("Quorum mens una fuerat,
sepultura non separet.").
71. See Uffing of Werden, De sancta Ida vidua, in II ACTA SANCTORUM
SEPTEMBRiS, 255, 260-69 (1756); see also JEAN LECLERCQ, MONKS ON
MARRIAGE: A TWELFTH-CENTURY VIEw 48-50 (1982) (reviewing the life of
St. Ida).
72. See LECLERCQ, supra note 71, at 48-49; Uffing of Werden, supra note
71, at 261.
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herself to a life of austere sanctity and charity toward the poor.73 She
eventually ordered a marble tomb to be built for both of them,
7 4
where "[tiheir bodies [would be] united in the grave forever."
75
That these expectations were well-entrenched at the dawn of the
second millenium should perhaps not be surprising. In an enchanted
world, where the boundary lines between the living and the dead
were not clearly drawn,76 where a whole spirit world seemed
palpable and nearly within reach,77 the social ideal of husbands and
wives remaining side-by-side, awaiting eternity, probably seemed
like an altogether natural extension of lived reality.
This understanding of eternal togetherness remained deeply
embedded in the law at the beginning of the twelfth century. Ivo of
Chartres (ca. 1040-1115) was a pupil of Lanfranc, a classmate of
Anselm of Canterbury, and the reform-minded bishop of Chartres
from his election in 1090 to his death in 1115.78 He was also the
greatest canon lawyer of his day, compiling three major works on
canon law and authoring a text, known as the Prologue, which laid
down basic rules of legal interpretation that would exercise great
influence on subsequent canonistic development. 79 Ivo included in
73. See LECLERCQ, supra note 71, at 49-50; Uffing of Werden, supra note
71, at 262.
74. See Uffing of Werden, supra note 71, at 262.
75. LECLERCQ, supra note 71, at 50.
76. See VALERIE I.J. FLINT, THE RISE OF MAGIC: IN EARLY MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 213-16 (1991); STEPHEN WILSON, THE MAGICAL UNIVERSE:
EVERYDAY RITUAL AND MAGIC IN PRE-MODERN EUROPE 297-302 (2000).
77. See, e.g., FLINT, supra note 76, at 101-08, 146-72; see also Peter M. De
Wilde, Between Life and Death: The Journey in the Otherworld, in DEATH
AND DYING IN THE MIDDLE AGES 175, 175-82 (Edelgard E. DuBruck &
Barbara I. Gusick eds., 1999) (documenting visions and other experiences of
the spirit world).
78. See generally ROLF SPRANDEL, IVO VON CHARTRES UND SEINE
STELLUNG IN DER KIRCHENGESCHICHTE [IVO OF CHARTRES AND HIS PLACE IN
CHURCH HISTORY] (1962) (reviewing the life and career of St. Ivo of
Chartres); 7 DICTIONARY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 21-22 (Joseph R. Strayer ed.,
1986) (providing a brief summary of the life and works of Ivo of Chartres).
79. See Ivo of Chartres, Decretum, 161 PATROLOGIA LATINA 59, 59-1022
(1889) [hereinafter Ivo, Decretwn]; Ivo of Chartres, Panormia, 161
PATROLOGIA LATINA 1041-344 (1889); Ivo of Chartres, Collectio Tripartita
(remains unpublished) (which include Ivo's canonistic compilations); see also
KtRY, supra note 63, at 244-50 (reviewing manuscript and publication history
of Ivo of Chartres' work); YVES DE CHARTRES, PROLOGUE (Jean
Werckrneister ed. & trans., 1997) (setting forth Ivo's theory of legal
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his Decretum the same four texts that Burchard employed, making it
clear that the teaching on wives following their husbands remained
intact.
80
Gratian, too, made use of these texts.8' The overarching concern
of Causa 13, quaestio 2, where he inserted these texts, related to the
proper ownership of tithes and other fees payable to the church,
including those payable upon burial.82 Gratian opened his analysis
by inquiring into the possession of the ius funerandi, by which he
meant not the right of the individual to choose a place of burial but
rather the right of the church to collect its burial fees.8 3 Married
persons, Gratian stated, following St. Jerome, were obliged to be
buried in a single grave. 84 Although Gratian did not explicitly state
his conclusion, he apparently intended by this rule that a pastor of a
deceased husband would also subsequently bury his widow, thus
allowing the parish to collect fees for both funerals.
Gratian, however, also articulated principles in his Decretum
that stood in seeming contradiction to a hard and fast rule requiring
wives to follow their men in the choice of burial places.
Immediately after reproducing Gregory the Great's description of St.
Benedict's sister seeking burial in Benedict's tomb, Gratian posed
the issue of the proper burial place of adult children.85 Are such
children obliged to choose the burial places of their parents? It
seemed, Gratian initially replied, that they were. 86 After all, it is
recorded that St. Philip built a tomb for himself and his family,87 and
interpretation).
80. Compare Ivo, Decretum, supra note 79, at Lib. 3, c.223 with
BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c.160; Ivo, Decretum, supra note 79, at Lib. 3,
c.224 with BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c.161; Ivo, Decretum, supra note 79,
at Lib. 3, c.225 with BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c. 162; Ivo, Decretum, supra
note 79, at Lib. 3, c.226 with BURCHARD, supra note 64, at c.163.
81. Compare C.13 q.2 c.2 with Ivo, Decretum, supra note 79, at Lib. 3,
cc.223-24; C.13 q.2 c.3 with Ivo, Decretum, supra note 79, at Lib. 3, cc.225-
26.
82. See C.13 q.2 pr.
83. See C.13 q.2 d.a.c.2.
84. See id. ("Sicut Ieronimus scribit, coniugati in uno sepulcro videntur esse
ponendi.").
85. See C. 13 q.2 d.p.c.3; see also supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text
(discussing Gregory the Great and St. Scholastica on burial).
86. See C.14 q.2 d.p.c.3.
87. See id.
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Saint Severus, archbishop of Ravenna, built a tomb for himself, his
wife, and his daughter.
88
But not everyone chose to be buried with their parents. Isaac
was buried next to Abraham, but Ishmael, Abraham's son by his
servant girl, was not.89 Nor were Adam's children all buried with
Adam. Indeed, this would have been impossible, given that the
whole multitude of the human race could not be accommodated in
such a small burial site.90 If children were free to make this choice,
one might reason, though Gratian did not, why not wives?
Gratian continued his analysis by including a text of Gregory the
Great holding that the final wishes (ultima voluntas or last will) of
the decedent should in all respects (in modis omnibus) be respected. 91
He followed this text with one from the Council of Tribur allowing
Christians to choose freely to be buried at the episcopal see, or with
congregations of canons, monks, nuns, or at the parish where they
paid their tithes.92 Acknowledging the possibility of choice, Gratian
returned his analysis to the issue of children electing to be buried
apart from their parents: It is one thing when the choice is the result
of pride, and quite another when it is made for some reasonable
cause.93 As Gregory the Great put it, the freely chosen last will of
the decedent to seek "new hospitality" for his body ought to be
respected.94
The early decretists had relatively little to say on the subject of
women following their husbands in death. The Summa parisiensis
merely noted that it was Rachel who was buried next to Jacob, 5
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See C.13 q.2 c.4.
92. See C.13 q.2 c.6.
93. See C.13 q.2 d.p.c.7 ("Sed aliud est ex temeritatis superbia, usum
antiquorum parentum non sequi, atque aliud rationabili occasione novam sibi
sepulturam .. ").
94. Id. ("Secundum Gregorium autem liberam habet ultimam voluntatem
qui certae rationis causa novum suo corpori querit hospitium."). Gratian
acknowledged that the expression ultima voluntas might have a double
meaning. While he used the expression to specify one's final determinations
regarding burial, "certain others" (quidam) used the term to describe the
testamentun, the property arrangements one makes in contemplation of death.
Id.
95. See THE SUMMA PARIsiENsis ON TE DECRETUM OF GRATIANI C.13 q.2
c.2 v. Ebron (Terence P. McLaughlin, C.S.B. ed., 1952).
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while Stephen of Tournai called attention to the physical dimensions
of the tomb of the patriarchs. 96 Rufinus, in contrast, emphasized the
importance of honoring the final will of the decedent, "since there is
no greater duty owed to men than" recognizing decisions which can
no longer be altered.97
It is possible that this reticence was the result of changing social
expectations; for it is now understood that the twelfth century was a
period of blossoming "individualism." 98 Beginning in the twelfth
century, one sees new developments in the social and economic
spheres that gave an increasing range of choice to increasing
numbers of individuals. In the realms of theology and philosophy
one encounters new inquiries that emphasized such concerns as the
inward development of the individual soul and its survival following
the believer's death,99 as well as inquiries into questions of personal
autonomy and responsibility.100  Also, it was during the twelfth
century that Gratian pioneered the consent theory of marriage,
making the exchange of consent of the parties central to the
96. See STEPHAN VON DOORNICK, DIE SUMMA OBER DAS DECRETUM
GRATIANI [STEPHEN OF TOURNAi, SUMMA ON THE DECRETUM OF GRATIAN]
C. 13 q.2 c.2 v. Ebron (Johann Friedrich von Schulte ed., 1965).
97. RuFiNus VON BOLOGNA, SUMMA DECRETORUM C.13 q.2. c.4 v. ultima
voluntas (Heinrich Singer ed., 1963) ("nichil enim est quod hominibus
debeatur quam ut supreme voluntatis, postquam aliud velle non possunt ....").
98. See generally COLIN MORRIS, THE DISCOVERY OF THE INDIVIDUAL
1050-1200 (1972) [hereinafter MORRIS, DISCOVERY] (discussing the
development of individualism as an essential attribute of Western Christian
society); Caroline Walker Bynum, Did the Twelfth Century Discover the
Individual? 31 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 1 (1980) (reviewing and questioning
aspects of Morris's argument); Colin Morris, Individualism in Twelfth-Century
Religion: Some Further Reflections, 31 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HIST. 195 (1980)
(responding to Bynum).
99. See MORRIS, DISCOVERY, supra note 98, at 76-78. See generally Odon
Lottin, L 'identitj de 'dme et de ses facult6s pendant la premiare moitij du
XIlIe sile [The Identity of the Soul and Its Faculties in the First Half of the
Thirteenth Century], 36 REVUE NtOSCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE 191 (1934)
(considering scholastic treatments of the individual soul and its attributes).
100. See generally EDOUARD-HENRI WEBER, LA PERSONNE HUMAINE AU
XIIIE SItCLE: L'AVtNEMENT CHEZ LES MAITRES PARISIENS DE L'ACCEPTION
MODERNE DE L'HOMME [THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY:
THE PARISIAN MASTERS AND THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN MEANING OF MAN]
(1991) (examining the scholastic foundations of modem conceptions of the
human person).
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formation of marriage thereby repudiating a tradition that gave wide
room to parental arrangements.'1
0
That social expectations were, indeed, changing is definitively
evidenced by a decretal issued by Pope Lucius III (reigned 1181-
1185) declaring that a wife should have a free faculty equal to her
husband in choosing her place of burial (liberam... aequalem...
facultatem).10 2 In a choice such as this, Lucius continued, the
woman should be released from her husband's rule (mulier solvitur a
lege viri).0 3 The teaching of Jerome and Augustine that a wife
should follow her husband was thereby rejected in favor of the
principle of free choice, which Gratian had introduced into his
analysis of selection of burial site but failed to apply to wives.
Furthermore, by choosing the word facultas Pope Lucius III
connected this freedom of choice with an emerging rights vocabulary
that stressed individual discretion in matters fundamental to one's
spiritual development. 1
04
Lucius's decretal became the foundation of thirteenth-century
canonistic analysis of choice of burial ground. Bernard of Parma
began his summary of the decretal by observing that just as the
husband is free to choose his place of burial, so also is the wife, and
there is no difference between them because the wife is released
from her husband's rule.'0 5 Glossing the word aequalem, Bernard
raised as an objection Jerome's invocation of Matthew 19:6, "what
God has joined together, man may not separate," and replied that
Jerome's exegesis operated only where the wife has not chosen her
place of burial. 10 6 But where she has chosen to be buried apart from
her husband, the holding of Pope Lucius's decretal prevails. '
07
101. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Power to Choose, 4 VIATOR 419 (1973); see
also infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (considering further Judge
Noonan's study of Gratian's consent theory).
102. See X 3.28.7.
103. See id.
104. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., Thirteenth-Century Canon Law and Rights: The
Word ius and Its Range of Subjective Meanings, 30 STUDIA CANONICA 295,
314-19 (1996).
105. See BERNARD OF PARMA, ORDINARY GLOSS X 3.28.7 v. casus ("Sicut
liberum est viro eligere sepulturam, ita liberum est mulieri; nulla est in hoe
casu inter eos differentia, cum a lege viri soluta esse intelligatur.").
106. Id. at X 3.28.7 v. aequalem.
107. See id.
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Innocent IV, in his Commentaria, proposed two possible ways
to reconcile Lucius's decretal with the texts of Gratian's Decretum
without accepting either interpretation. 108 It is possible, Innocent
reasoned, to see Gratian's texts as establishing the socially proper
course of conduct (de honestate) while Lucius's decretal established
a kind of legal minimum (de iure).10 9 But it is also possible, the
pope-turned-canonist continued, to accept Bernard's reading of
Gratian's texts as applicable only in cases where the wife has not
herself chosen a place of burial." 0
Raymond of Pefiafort sided with Bernard. Commencing his
analysis, Raymond declared broadly: "I say ... that any living adult
of sound judgment can choose to be buried where he/she
wishes ... ."" Raymond went on to make clear that wives, as well
as husbands, enjoyed this freedom: "About the wife whose husband
has died, I say that she is able to choose to be buried apart from her
husband. But if she dies without selecting a place of burial, then I
believe she ought to be buried with her husband."
'"12
Hostiensis offered perhaps the most complex and thorough
defense of Lucius's decretal and in the process displayed his own
virtuosic command of Roman law. He began his gloss to aequalem
by noting that scripture seemed to stand against Pope Lucius. "What
God has joined together," Hostiensis observed, quoting the first half
of Matthew 19:6, expecting his readers to fill in the second half."3
But, Hostiensis continued, citing to a phrase in Justinian's Novel 22,
it is death, which looses all things, which separates the couple in the
instant case, not man. 14 However, Hostiensis noted that another
passage of Roman law seemed to stand against this proposition. He
observed that wives are immunized from suits charging the
108. See INNOCENT IV, COMMENTARIA X 3.28.7 v. liberam.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. RAYMOND OF PERAFORT, SUMMA DE PAEN1TENTIA 435 (Xaviero Ochoa
& Aloisio Diez eds., 1976) ("[D]ico... quod quilibet adultus et discretus
vivens potest eligere sepulturam ubicumque .... ").
112. Id. at 436 ("De uxore, dico, cuius maritus defunctus est, quod potest
eligere sepulturam, etiam alibi quam in sepulchro viri. Si tamen moriatur, non
electa sepultura, credo quod debeat sepeliri cum viro.").
113. HOsTIENsIs, supra note 29, at X 3.28.7 v. aequalem (quoting Matthew
19:6).
114. See id.; see also Nov. 22.20 (Justianian 535) ("Deinceps autem
matrimoniorum terminum quae omne similiter solvit expectat mors.").
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plundering of an estate, because they are their husband's helpmate,
"both in human affairs and in their heavenly home."
I 5
If, then, women share a heavenly residence with their husbands
even on the authority of Roman law, how might one preserve Pope
Lucius's teaching? Hostiensis turned first to Innocent IV's
distinction between conduct that is socially proper (de honestate) and
that which is legally allowed (de iure).116 Lucius's teaching might be
the strict law, but propriety teaches women to follow their husbands
in death as well as life. Hostiensis, however, suggested an even
better answer (vel melius dic).117 Where a husband has chosen to be
buried in his own church, or even in another church, and his wife has
not specified a place of burial for herself, she should be seen as
following her husband."' This much, Hostiensis made clear through
a series of cross-references to Roman legal texts, was demanded by
the ancient law.119
Where, however, a wife has chosen her own place of burial, her
choice must be respected (electioni suae standum esset), whatever
the disposition her husband may have made. 120  This conclusion
should be seen simply as a practical elaboration of Gregory the
Great's principle that the last will of the decedent must be
respected. Hostiensis reiterated the conclusion in his gloss to
facultatem: A wife is obliged to remain under her husband's
authority, but this authority is dissolved with her husband's death. 22
Accordingly, she is free to choose her own place of burial.
123
115. HOSTIENSIS, supra note 29, at X 3.28.7 v. aequalem ("quae socia rei
humanae atque divinae domus"); see also CODE JUST. 9.32.4 (Gordianus 242)
(providing an imperial decree immunizing wives from suits alleging the
plundering of their husbands' estates).
116. See HOsTIENsIs, supra note 29, at X 3.28.7 v. aequalem.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.; CODE JUST. 12.1.13 (Valentinianus, Theodosius, and Arcadius
392) (ordering that women should share the same social status as their
husbands); see also DIG. 50.1.22.1 (Paulus, Sententiarum 1) (teaching that a
widow retains the same domicile as her deceased husband). By analogy,
therefore, a wife should follow her husband's choice of burial site.
120. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 29, at X 3.28.7 v. aequalem.
121. See id.
122. See id. at v. facultatem.
123. See id.
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Pope Lucius's decree, fortified by the teaching of the thirteenth-
century canonists, became the established teaching of the church.
Johannes Andreae, writing in the fourteenth century, took the prior
commentary for granted when he asserted that "a married woman can
freely choose her place of burial.' 124 Luis de Molina, the great
Portuguese Jesuit, writing at the end of the sixteenth century, reached
a similar conclusion.125 He asserted that every living person is able
to select his or her own place of burial, even if it means rejecting the
family burial site or selecting a place that is "less holy."'126 Just as a
husband is able to select a place of burial, so may a wife, although
she is to follow her husband where she has not made an independent
choice. 127 A wife, Molina noted, might have good reason to do this:
She might be divorced from her husband, she might have married a
man of lesser social status, or her husband might have died a long
time ago and she might now wish to be buried in her father's family
tomb.'
28
The principle of free selection came to be incorporated as well
into the great seventeenth-century work on cemetery law written by
Peter Murga. 129 Murga simply took for granted the principle that a
wife might select her own place of burial, even if her husband was
still alive.130 Just as her husband is free, so also his wife is free to
make this choice. Relying on Lucius's decretal, Murga reasoned that
there is no difference between male and female in this instance since
the wife is understood to be released from her husband's authority
upon death. 131
This basic freedom came to be codified in the 1917 Code of
Canon Law, which declared that a wife and children may select their
124. JOHANNES ANDREAE, COMMENTARIA X 3.28.7 casus.
125. See LuIS DE MOLINA, DE LUSTITIA ET URE [ON JUSTICE AND RIGHT]
Lib. 1, disp.214, cols.904-08 (1733).
126. Id. at col.906. By "less holy," Molina meant places where the sacrifice
of the mass and the divine office are said less often. See id.
127. See id. at col.907.
128. See id.
129. See generally PETER DE MURGA, DISQUISITIONES MORALES ET
CANONICAE (1666) (the leading early modem treatise on cemetery law).
130. See id. at 300 ("An mulier, marito vivente, sibi possit Sepulturam
eligere?").
131. See id. ("Sicut liberum est viro eligere Sepulturam, ita liberum est
mulieri. Nulla est differentia inter eos in hoc casu, cum a lege viri soluta esse
intelligatur.").
490
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places of burial immune of paternal power.'32 The 1983 Code of
Canon Law, for its part, announced that everyone, unless forbidden
by law, shall be allowed to choose his or her own place of burial.'33
Today, this rule seems like a self-evident proposition, but the law
might have taken a very different course had it not been for the
efforts of Pope Lucius III and the thirteenth-century decretalists to
establish parity between men and women on the subject of Christian
burial.
IU. THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE A MARRIAGE PARTNER
It is assumed today that marriage is based on the freely
exchanged consent of the parties. But this assumption, like the
freedom to select one's place of burial, originated in the matrix of
twelfth century legal writing, particularly that of Gratian. Roman
law followed very different rules on the subject of marital formation.
Marriage under Roman law was, to be sure, agreed to by the parties,
but "[o]ver and above the consent of the immediate parties, that of
their paterfamilias (head of household) was indispensable."'
134
Among upper-class Romans, for whom Roman domestic relations
law was chiefly concerned, the making of a marriage involved
complex negotiations implicating business and political
considerations and the need to create or cement ties among
competing families. 135 In this context, mere passive acceptance by a
son was sufficient consent to his father's will.136 The standard set by
Roman law for women was even less demanding: a girl who did not
resist her father was presumed to have consented to marriage, an
132. See 1917 CODE c.1223, § 2.
133. See 1983 CODE c.1180, § 2; see also THE CANON LAW LETTER &
SPIRIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE CODE OF CANON LAW 669-70 (Gerard
Sheehy et al. eds., 1995) (elaborating on the principle that individuals should
be able to choose their place of burial).
134. PERCY ELLWOOD CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 57
(1930).
135. See SUSAN TREGGIARi, ROMAN MARRIAGE: IUST] CONIUGES FROM THE
TIME OF CICERO TO THE TIME OF ULPIAN 125-60 (1991).
136. The relevant text provided: "Si patre cogente ducit uxorem, quam non
duceret, si sui arbitrii esset, contraxit tarnen matrimonium, quod inter inuitos
non contrahitur: maluisse hoe uidetur." [If at a father's compulsion, one takes
a wife, whom one would not have taken if left to one's own judgment, he has
nevertheless contracted marriage, which is not contracted among the unwilling,
but he appears to have preferred it.] DIG. 23.2.22 (Celsus, Digestorum 15).
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excerpt of Ulpian, found in the Digest, provided; and, Ulpian went
on, she may only resist her father where the prospective husband is
unworthy in his morals or "foul.',
13 7
In an important article, Judge John Noonan, Jr., considered the
originality of Gratian's consent theory of marriage. 138 Although
Gratian's sources-Roman law, patristic literature, decrees of early
popes like Leo the Great-firmly favored a role for parental consent
in the marriages of their children, Gratian rejected such a rule.
139
Henceforth, the consent of the parties alone sufficed to make a
marriage, and this consent could neither be invalidated nor supplied
by parents or by others. 140  Furthermore, in Gratian's mind this
consent was of a very special type: "[N]ot any consent, not merely
lustful consent to intercourse, not merely intellectual consent to a
shared life, but consent informed with that special quality that
Gratian, drawing on the Roman law, denominated 'marital affection,'
an emotion-colored assent to the other as husband or wife."'
141
While subsequent canonists and theologians would engage in a
long and bitter struggle over the relationship of consent as opposed
to consummation in marital formation-the compromise eventually
achieved made consent central while holding that consummation
conferred a special firmness on marriage that made it
indissoluble 142 -the free agreement of the parties remained the
foundation of the canonistic theory of marriage. Even in the face of
the social disruption that was thereby caused by the problem of
clandestine marriages (marriages in the absence of an official church
witness), the church continued to teach that the parties themselves
made a marriage through the exchange of freely given, present-tense
consent.
143
137. See DIG. 23.1.12 (Ulpian, De sponsalibus) ("[S]ed quae patris uoluntati
non repugnat, consentire intellegitur. Tunc autem solum dissentiendi a patre
licentia filiae conceditur, si indignum moribus vel turpem sponsum ei pater
eligat.").
138. See Noonan, supra note 101.
139. See id. at 422-24, 426 (citing Gratian C.32 q.2 d.a.c.6).
140. See id. at 433. "[I]n recognizing an area of freedom where parents
should not trespass, the canons acknowledged rights of the individual not
dependent on family." Id.
141. Id. at425.
142. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN
MEDIEVAL EUROPE 235-42, 260-78 (1987).
143. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 142, at 361-64, 440-43, 496-501; see also
492
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In the process of guaranteeing parties free choice in the matter
of marriage partners, the canonists created a zone of legally protected
freedom that came to be conceptualized as a right.144 The canonists
developed at least two different legal doctrines to safeguard this
right. On the one hand, they made use of an interpretive doctrine
called, in shorthand, prohibitoria edicta (prohibitory edicts) as a
means of invalidating laws that had the effect of restricting the right
to marry. 14 The doctrine on prohibitory edicts taught that in the case
of certain fundamental rights, legislation prohibiting the exercise of a
given right would be strictly construed. 146  Thus, in the case of
marriage, "all individuals not expressly forbidden to marry were
permitted to marry."'147 The decretalists relied on this doctrine to
teach that laws preventing the marriages of deaf-mutes, slaves, and
even lepers should be considered invalid. 148 In practice, this doctrine
must have closely resembled the operation of the modem strict
scrutiny doctrine in its concern for individual choice.'
49
The right to marriage was protected in a second way as well. In
order to protect the freedom needed for valid consent, the canonists
put into place a structure of law designed to guard against the use of
coercion by parents or by third parties.150 The decretal Veniens ad
nos, authored by Pope Alexander III, referred to a man, "G," who
had fathered a child by a mere girl (puella), and subsequently found
himself compelled (coegit) to marry her.' 15 Alexander instructed the
Noonan, supra note 101, at 430 ("The rule [on clandestine marriage] chimed
with the rule recognizing the right to reject a parental choice. In combination
they put power to marry in the hands of those getting married.").
144. See Reid, supra note 18, at 73-80; see also BRUNDAGE, supra note 142,
at 431 (documenting the actionability of this right in the ecclesiastical courts).
145. See Reid, supra note 18, at 78-80.
146. Hostiensis also indicated the right to postulate candidates to office and
the right to make a will were also governed by the doctrine on prohibitory
edicts. See HOsTIENsIs, SUMMA Lib. 1 De postulando § 2. In each example,
personal freedom trumped most other concerns.
147. Reid, supra note 18, at 78.
148. See id. at 79-80.
149. See id. at 80.
150. See id. at 74-80.
151. See X 4.1.15; see also Charles Donahue Jr., The Policy ofAlexander the
Third's Consent Theory of Marriage, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 251, 251-53 (Stephan
Kuttner ed., 1976) (proposing to examine the policy behind Alexander's
decretal).
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judge hearing the case to determine the validity of G's consent by
reference to whether the force and fear brought to bear against him
was sufficient to move a steady man (constans vir).
152
The expression constans vir was subsequently adopted by the
canonists as the measure to be utilized in assessing impermissible
force and fear. Some decretalist commentary connected the sort of
fear that would move a steady man with threats of death or grave
bodily harm. 153  But nearly from the beginning the popes were
willing to contemplate a broader range of factors than mere physical
suffering. Thus, Gregory IX, in the decretal Gemma, invalidated a
betrothal agreement that contained a penalty clause requiring
forfeiture of a fixed sum in the event the betrothal was repudiated.
154
"This decretal recognize[d] that fear need not only be the product of
physical threats. Financial and other concerns might also give rise to
an impermissible fear."'155 The canonists would eventually work the
concept of the steady man into "a fictional man of average fortitude
who served in fear cases much as a 'prudent man' is used to measure
negligence in modem tort law."'
156
In the decretal Consultationi, Honorius III explicitly applied the
steady man test to women. 1 7 He declared that women who flee their
husbands protesting that they were compelled to give consent by
reason of force and fear, even though they inwardly dissented, ought
to have their day in court.158 Where the fear they experienced was
sufficient to move a steady man, the pope reasoned, the marriages
themselves should be invalidated. 5 9
Even though the pope used "male" language in this decretal,
holding women to the standard constans vir, at least one canonist,
152. See X 4.1.15.
153. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 29, at X 4.1.15 v. in constantem (citing
Abbas sancti cadmundi X 1.40.2 (a decretal of Alexander III's ruling against
an abbot who threatened a local priest with forcible ejection from his church);
Cum dilectus X 1.40.6 (a decree of Innocent III equating the sort of fear that
would move a steady man with metum mortis (threat of death) or cruciatum
corporis (physical torture))).
154. See X 4.1.29.
155. Reid, supra note 18, at 76.
156. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Steady Man: Process and Policy in the Courts
of the Roman Curia, 58 CAL. L. REv. 628, 654 (1970).
157. See X 4.1.28.
158. See id.
159. See id.
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Hostiensis, argued that the impact of force and fear on women might
be different than on men.160 Hostiensis premised his analysis on the
principle that fear cases must be judged by the totality of
circumstances. Threats of violence might invalidate consent, but so
might financial threats, such as disinheritance."' A good judge,
Hostiensis noted, will examine the sort of persons (qualitate
personarum) alleging force and fear, the type of force or compulsion
brought to bear, its time and place, and whether consent was
subsequently ratified or whether the party always dissented.
162
In this context, Hostiensis observed, one factor to bear in mind
was whether the party making the allegations was a woman. A
woman's consent might be impeded by a lesser fear than a man's.
63
Women are the more fragile sex, Hostiensis noted, employing a
stereotype of his day, reasoning that the Latin word for women
(mulier) is derived from "softness of heart" (mollice cordis).164 In
assessing Hostiensis's analysis, one should avoid the easy criticism
that he is merely reflecting the kind of misogynistic world- view
common to many thirteenth-century writers. In fact, Hostiensis
seems to be coming to terms with the full range of possibilities in
force and fear cases and acknowledging that women-who, in a
male-dominated world, may be more vulnerable to economic as well
as physical threats-might in the proper circumstances be in greater
need ofjudicial solicitude.
Women in the later Middle Ages were able to avail themselves
both of the freedom to contract marriage and the protection afforded
by the doctrine on coerced consent. It is doubtlessly true that many,
probably most, marriages of the later Middle Ages were the product
of at least some kind of parental arrangement. 165  But the whole
weight of ecclesiastical authority now favored freedom. The
marriage liturgies that developed in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries required the church's minister to inquire into the couple's
160. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 146, at Lib. 4 De matrimoniis § 27.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Shannon McSheffrey, "I Will Never Have None Ayenst My Faders
Will": Consent and the Making of Marriage in the Late Medieval Diocese of
London, in WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN MEDIEVAL CHRISTENDOM
153, 157-59 (Constance M. Rousseau & Joel T. Rosenthal eds., 1998).
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willingness to have one another as man and wife. 166 Handbooks for
pastors reminded priests of the importance of the parties' freedom to
consent. 167 And it remained true that couples who were willing to
flaunt the disapproval of their families were free to marry one
another, even in the absence of church authority.
The degree to which such freedom was actually claimed by
parties is illustrated by the famous case of Margery Paston from the
fifteenth century. The Pastons were among the wealthiest and most
influential families of fifteenth-century England, and they left a large
record of their doings. 168  At the age of seventeen, Margery
clandestinely married Richard Calle, the family bailiff, over the
objections of the Paston family.169 The validity of the marriage was
ultimately sustained in a hearing before the Bishop of Norwich.
170
The penalty Margery faced for "not complying with the standards for
women of her social class . . .was social ostracism, both as a
member of her family and as a member of a specific class of
society."' 71 Her marriage, however, remained legally valid.
The record indicates that women, as well as men, were also able
to avail themselves of the protection of the teaching against coerced
consent. The decretal Gemma, in which Pope Gregory IX ruled a
penalty clause in a betrothal agreement an impermissible
infringement on liberty, involved a woman complainant.
172
166. See MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, Choice of Marriage Partner in the Middle
Ages: Development and Mode of Application of a Theory of Marriage, in
MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE: COLLECTED STUDIES
87, 113-17 (James K. Farge ed., 1996).
167. See Jacqueline Murray, Individualism and Consensual Marriage: Some
Evidence from Medieval England, in WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND FAMILY IN
MEDIEVAL CHRISTENDOM, supra note 165, at 121, 128-30.
168. See generally H.S. BENNETT, THE PASTONS AND THEIR ENGLAND:
STUDIES IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION (2d ed. 1932) (discussing the Paston
family as providing insight to daily life of fifteenth century England).
169. See FRANCES GIES & JOSEPH GIES, A MEDIEVAL FAMILY: THE
PASTONS OF FIFrEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 207-13, 219-21 (1998); Ann S.
Haskell, The Paston Women on Marriage in Fifteenth-Century England, 4
VIATOR 459, 467-71 (1973).
170. See Haskell, supra note 169, at 467; see also GIES, supra note 169, at
219-21 (demonstrating both the bishop's sympathies for the Paston family and
his adherence to the canon-law rule on freedom of consent).
171. Haskell, supra note 169, at 468.
172. See X 4.1.29.
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Furthermore, the surviving records of church courts provide evidence
that compelled consent was no consent.
173
At the end of the sixteenth century, the Jesuit canonist Tomds
Sdnchez authored De sancto matrimonii sacramento, (On the
Sacrament of Holy Matrimony), 174 what would prove to be "a
standard Roman Catholic guide to marriage problems until the mid-
twentieth century."' 75 "A lawyer, who was [s]ometimes... betrayed
by lawyer's vices of which he was not free-a fondness for
distinctions, a formalism which attempted to win substantive points
by the rearrangement of abstract concepts,"'176 Sdnchez was also "a
grave and just and subtle spirit," 177 who mastered the entire medieval
tradition of matrimonial law and theology "with the suppleness and
firmness of a supreme craftsman or a true artist.'
178
Sdnchez analyzed the question of force and fear as it pertained
to women as part of his larger treatment of reverential fear.
Reverential fear, that natural respect and awe that a subject feels
towards a superior, such as a son toward his father or a wife toward
her husband, 179 was insufficient, by itself, to invalidate a marriage.
180
Only when accompanied by outward actions, such as threats or
beatings, which have the effect of inducing fear in a constant man,
might reverential fear be considered as an invalidating factor.18 ' To
this point, there was very little to suggest that Sanchez would depart
from an already well-worn path.
However, Sdnchez understood, as Hostiensis had before him,
that different levels of fear might operate differently on persons
173. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 142, at 454; HELMHOLZ, supra note 9, at
220-28; FREDERIK PEDERSEN, MARRIAGE DISPUTES IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
121-28 (2000).
174. See THOMAS SANCHEZ, DE SANCTO MATRIMONI SACRAMENTO
DISPUTATIONUM (1637).
175. BRUNDAGE, supra note 142, at 564.
176. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND
MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA 31 (1972).
177. Id.
178. Id. at31-32.
179. See SANCHEZ, supra note 174, at Lib. 4, De consensu coacto, disp.6,
no.4 summarium ("metus reverentiae quo inferior reverentia superioris, uxor
viri, filius patris, etc .....
180. See id.
181. See id. at no.7 ("Ultima sententia (quam multo veriorem reputo) docet,
solum metum reverentialem, nisi minae, aut verbera, aut alius metus gravis illis
adjungatur, non cadere in virum constantem .... ").
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depending on their condition. A son of adult age might respond
differently to threats than a daughter who is a mere girl, or a son who
is underage. 182 What of a daughter who is subjected to her father's
wrath (indignatio)? Is mere fear of a father's wrath sufficient to
invalidate?
Sdnchez commenced his answer conventionally enough: "If a
daughter contracts marriage without precedent threats, but only
because of the fear she might incur her father's wrath, it is valid,
since this fear is not accounted as moving a steady man."'
' 83
However, Sdnchez made a distinction: If it is likely that the father's
wrath will not long endure, and there is hope of reconciliation, this is
one thing; but where it is probable that a father's or a husband's
wrath will endure a long time, or forever, in such circumstances,
S achez believed the fear would be sufficient to invalidate. 184 One
sees in Sdnchez's answer both his "fondness for distinctions" and his
keen awareness of the complexity of human emotions and their
impact on free consent. 1
85
In this way, an analysis of force and fear sensitive to the
individual person, both male and female, and to particular
circumstance, was carried forward into the sixteenth century. The
right of women under the law to consent freely to marriage was thus
preserved in a way that was sensitive to the ways in which family
authority might be asserted in the early modem era. And, through
Sdnchez, modem canon law came to inherit a developed theory of
force and fear and its potential impact on matrimonial consent.
182. See id. at no.8 ("Unus tamen... hanc sent. limitat, dicens ad
matrimonium irritandum non sat esse metum reverentialem patris cum minis
nisi simul adsint verbera, in filio masculo adultae aetatis, secus in filia puella,
& filio impubere .... ).
183. Id. no.14 ("Infertur si filia matri. contrahat non praecedentibus minis,
solum eo timore, ne patris indignatio incurrat esse validum: non enim is metus
censetur cadens in virum constantem.").
184. See id. ("Hoc tamen moderarer, ut intelligatur, quando indigantio ilia
patris vel viri non diii pennanebit, sed spes est futurae reconciliationis: si enim
teneret probabiliter diuturnam fore indignationem & semper se habiturum
patrem, aut virum vald6 infestum, & indignatum, objecturumque passim illam
inobedientiam, crediderim esse timorem cadentem in virum constantem.").
185. NOONAN, supra note 176, at 31.
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IV. THE CONJUGAL RIGHT
Women not only shared equally in the right to choose a marriage
partner, they also shared equally in the right to demand satisfaction
of the conjugal debt. The notion of a conjugal debt has its origins in
St. Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians:
Let the husband render to the wife her due, and likewise the
wife to the husband. The wife has not authority over her
body, but the husband; the husband likewise has not
authority over his body, but the wife. Do not deprive each
other, except.., by consent, for a time, that you may give
yourselves to prayer; and return together again lest Satan
tempt you because you lack self-control. But this I say by
way of concession, not by way of commandment.1
8 6
"The term that is translated above as 'due' is the Greek word
opheile. Opheile unambiguously meant what was owing. It was a
debt. In the Vulgate, Jerome translated opheile as debitum. The
notion of what was owing or due was preserved by this
translation."'
187
The patristic authors subsequently made the conjugal debt a part
of their theology. In the fifth century, Augustine developed a
theology of marriage which saw the union of man and woman as
embodying three great goods: procreation; life-long fidelity between
the spouses; and the sacramental sign of Christ's union with the
church.'8 8  Marriage's end, or ultimate purpose, was the
advancement of love between the parties. 189 In this context,
Augustine distinguished between two types of sexual intercourse
within marriage: that undertaken for purposes of procreation, which
was entirely blameless; and that undertaken by reason of the Pauline
debt, which amounted to a pardonable wrong on the part of the one
seeking sexual satisfaction. 190 As Augustine put it, those who have
186. 1 Corinthians 7:3-6 (Saint Joseph New Catholic Edition).
187. Reid, supra note 18, at 81 (citing JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS TREATMENT BY THE CATHOLIC
THEOLOGIANS AND CANONIsTS 42 (enlarged ed., 1986)).
188. See Glenn W. Olsen, Progeny, Faithfulness, Sacred Bond: Marriage in
the Age of Augustine, in CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE: A HISTORICAL STUDY 101,
121 (Glenn W. Olsen ed., 2001).
189. See id. at 121-22.
190. See AUGUSTINE, DE BONO CONIUGALI, 7, 15 (P.G. Walsh ed. & trans.,
Clarendon Press 2001); Augustinus Hipponensis, De bono coniugali, in 41
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intercourse "inflamed with passion are using their ius (right)
intemperately," but may nevertheless be forgiven their excesses. 191
While Augustine made use of rights language in describing the
conjugal debt, the idea of the conjugal relation as a right assertable
by the parties to a marriage was by no means a prominent part of his
thought. 192 Twelfth and thirteenth-century writers would, however,
juridicize the marital relation as understood by Augustine, and
thereby transform it into a set of mutually entailing rights assertable
by both parties to a marriage.193 This transformation commenced
with Gratian's treatment of the subject. Gratian grounded his
treatment of the conjugal debt on the standard medieval suspicion of
unrestrained sexuality. 194 Before the Fall from the Garden of Eden,
Gratian noted, the marriage bed was "immaculate," but expulsion
from Paradise brought with it sexual urges, necessary for
reproduction, but also capable of abuse. 195 Marriage was the proper
outlet for these impulses. Following Augustine, Gratian noted that
marital intercourse for procreative purposes was blameless, while
marital intercourse for the satisfying of lust was a pardonable
transgression.
196
Recognizing that St. Paul had counseled couples that they might
separate for a time in order to give themselves to prayer, Gratian
tested the limits of the Apostle's advice. Might a man permit his
wife to take a vow of continence and enter religious life? Might a
man take such a vow himself even though married? 197 Summarizing
his sources, Gratian concluded that either spouse may renounce the
debt, provided the other spouse freely consented.' 98 In such
circumstances, although the marriage bond endured, the sexual rights
CORPUS SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIAsTIcoRuM LATINORUM, 1.14.15 (1900)
[hereinafter Augustine, De bono coniugali]; Augustinus Hipponensis, De
nuptiis et concupiscentia, in 42 CORPUS SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIASTICORUM
LATiNORUM, 5.5, 6.6, 7 (1902).
191. See Augustine, De bono coniugali, supra note 190, at 194 ("[A]rdore
concupiscentiae ipso suo iure intemperanter utentes .....
192. See Reid, supra note 18, at 81 n.202.
193. See id. at81.
194. See Elizabeth M. Makowski, The Conjugal Debt and Medieval Canon
Law, 3 J. MEDIEvAL HIST. 99, 100-10 (1977).
195. See C.32 q.2 d.p.c.2.
196. See id.
197. See C.33 q.5 cc.10-1 1.
198. See C.33 q.5 d.p.c.1 1.
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thereby created ceased to be operative. And so, Gratian continued,
one who has absolved the other party from his or her right (a suo
lure) may not thereafter summon one's spouse back to this
obligation.
199
Canonists and theologians built on this foundation an impressive
structure of mutually entailing rights and obligations. The structure
of rights that was brought into being had its limitations. Because the
canonists conceptualized rights as claims which parties might freely
assert, they encountered a particular problem when they addressed
the problem of the reluctant bride-a woman who consented to
marriage but subsequently refused to consummate the union. This
problem led some writers to advocate extreme solutions
demonstrating that a formal equality of rights could lead to some
highly unequal results. But the canonists' reliance on rights
language also had its advantages. The conjugal right could serve as a
check on the exercise of arbitrary power and could even-as in the
case of the spouse who contracted leprosy-require truly heroic
conduct for the benefit of the ill spouse.
2°°
The problem of the right to consummation arose because of the
triumph of the consent theory of marriage. Consent, not
consummation, made a marriage, 01 and sexual relations, although
conferring a special indissoluble firmness to a marriage, were not
essential to the union's legal survival.2°2  After all, even though
Joseph and Mary were legally married and the very paradigm of holy
matrimony, they never consummated their union.20 3 But because
199. See id.
200. See infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text; see also infra notes
212-14 and accompanying text (documenting further the triumph of the
consent theory of marital formation). "Efficiens autem causa matrimonii est
consensus, non quilibet, sed per verba expressus, nec de futuro sed de
praesenti." ["The efficient cause of marriage is consent, not any [consent], but
that expressed through words not of future, but of present tense."] PETER
LOMBARD, LmRi IV SENTENTIARUM Lib. 4, dist.27, cc.3-4 (1916).
202. See James A. Brundage, Implied Consent to Intercourse, in CONSENT
AND COERCION TO SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL
SOCIETIES 245, 246-48 (Angeliki E. Laiou ed., 1993).
203. See generally Penny S. Gold, The Marriage of Mary and Joseph in the
Twelfth-Century Ideology of Marriage, in SEXUAL PRACTICES & THE
MEDIEVAL CHURCH 102 (Vern L. Bullough & James A. Brundage eds., 1982)
(discussing the virginal and marital ideal Joseph and Mary represented in the
Middle Ages). The decretist Rolandus argued that even though Joseph and
502 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 35:471
consummation did confer a special strength on marriage, and because
procreation was one of the fundamental goods of marriage, the
sexual relationship could not be ignored. Thus, the question: By
what right did parties consummate their unions? Furthermore, might
a marriage be forcibly consummated, where a spouse resisted?
Rolandus, a mid-twelfth-century decretist, 20 4 saw marriage as
consisting of two fides (faiths) which came into being by different
acts. Thefides of the matrimonial contract arose from the exchange
of consent between the parties, while the fides of carnal joining
brought about a "mutual servitude" for the purpose of discharging
the debt.20 5 Left unspoken by Rolandus was whether the husband
had a right to consummate the marriage and whether his bride had
the right to resist.
Huguccio addressed this question more directly, taking issue
squarely with Rolandus. It has been argued, Huguccio began, that
the right of demanding the conjugal debt (ius exigendi debitum) arose
only after the first act of intercourse. 20 6 Distinguishing between a
right and a right's execution, Huguccio maintained that the right to
demand the conjugal debt was a part of marriage itself, arising from
the exchange of promises between the parties, but its execution only
occurred after the bride was handed over or the nuptial blessing
conferred.20 7 Huguccio explained what he meant by execution when
Mary refrained from all sexual intercourse, they nevertheless satisfied all three
goods of marriage: fidelity, children, and sacramental unity. See SUMMA
MAGISTRI ROLANDI C.27 q.2 c.10 (Friedrich Thaner ed., 1962).
204. See generally John T. Noonan, Jr., Who Was Rolandus?, in LAW,
CHURCH, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF STEPHAN KUTNER 21
(Kenneth Pennington & Robert Somerville eds., 1977) (critically examining
the evidence of Rolandus's biography).
205. See SUMMA MAGISTRI ROLANDI, supra note 203, at C.27 q.2 cc.6, 27;
see also JAMES A. CORIDEN, THE INDISSOLUBILITY ADDED TO CHRISTIAN
MARRIAGE BY CONSUMMATION 7-9 (1961) (reviewing Rolandus'
contributions).
206. See Huguccio, Summa d'Huguccio sur le dicret de Gratien, 27
NOUVELLE REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANCAIS ET tTRANGER 745, 756
(1903).
207. See id. ("Mihi videtur quodjus exigendi est ipsum conjugium, vel oritur
ex eo, et statim competit ex quo est conjugium, sed non statim competit illius
juris executio, id est, actus exequendi illud jus .... Potest dici quod a tempore
traductionis vel traditionis vel benedictionis sacerdotalis."). Traductio or
traditio referred to the act of handing the bride over at the time of the marriage
itself. See BRUNDAGE, supra note 142, at 262; CORIDEN, supra note 205, at 3.
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he compared the right to demand the conjugal debt to the powers of a
priest under interdict to hear confession or the right of a creditor to
demand payment of a debt on a certain date.20 8 In both instances, a
right has been vested in the party by reason of a certain past event,
such as priestly ordination or the exchange of promises that created
the debt.209 But the authoritative power to exercise the right can only
be conferred by a subsequent occurrence-that is, the lifting of the
interdict, or the arrival of the date on which the debt has come due.
2 10
Bernard of Pavia, who wrote a treatise on marriage law at the
dawn of the thirteenth century, contrasted these two schools of
thought on the origin of the conjugal debt.21' Some have argued that
the debt arises with the first act of sexual intercourse, but the
problem with this school of thought, according to Bernard, is that if
the parties fail to consummate the marriage, the right never comes
into existence.212 Others have claimed that the right arises from the
exchange of promises, but that the right is not immediately activated,
but must await the handing over of the bride. 213 It is this latter
school of thought which had more appeal for Bernard. Either the
handing over of the bride, or better, the nuptial blessing, should be
seen as effectuating a completed marriage after which the parties
could equally claim the conjugal debt and were no longer free to
leave the marriage or pursue a religious vocation.
214
Both Huguccio and Bernard, however, avoided the very real
problem that was presented by a wife who was genuinely unwilling
to go through with the consummation. The author of the anonymous
Summa induent sancti, however, was not so reticent.215 The author
208. See Huguccio supra note 206.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See BERNARD OF PAVIA, Summa de matrimonio, in SUMMA
DECRETALIUM app. at 287-306 (E.A.T. Laspeyres ed., 1956) [hereinafter
BERNARD, Summa de matrimonio]; see also BRUNDAGE, supra note 9, at 210-
11 (commenting on Bernard's career).
212. See BERNARD, Swnma de matrimonio, supra note 211, at 299.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Regarding the publication of this Summa, we are told: "The summa is a
product of the French school and dates from about 1192-1195." SUMMA
INDUENT SANCTI: A CRITICAL EDITION OF A TWELFTH-CENTURY CANONICAL
TREATISE 2 (Richard Michael Fraher ed., 1978) [hereinafter SUMMA INDUENT
SANCTI].
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began conventionally enough by proposing that prior to
consummation either party was free to enter religious life without the
other's consent.2 16 Indeed, Pope Alexander III, in the decretal Ex
publico, had allowed a bride who gave present-tense consent, but
who had not consummated her marriage, of two months to decide
whether to choose religious life.21 7
But, the author continued, suppose that her husband has chosen
to consummate the marriage "violently" (violenter), before she has
entered a monastery? 218 He has used his right (file enim usus iure
suo). 219 He has brought force to bear without deceit; indeed, the
force he has used can be called just and is comparable in its justness
to the force used by the magistrate. 220 Citing to a second decretal of
Alexander, the author conceded that a woman may enter the convent
prior to a marriage's consummation without her husband's consent,
but only so long as there has been no sexual intercourse. 22' But here
there has been sexual intercourse. The husband has had carnal
relations with his espoused in virtue of his right, even though his
partner has resisted. 22 Furthermore, the author added, it is a mortal
sin for the woman to refuse her husband in these circumstances,
unless she is prepared to enter the monastery at once.
223
It seems that subsequent canonists were unwilling to press the
logic of the right of demanding the conjugal debt as far as did the
author of the Summa induent sancti. Nevertheless, it remained the
case that a party might be compelled to consummate a marriage.
Hostiensis made this point in his commentary on Ex publico.
224
Hostiensis first observed that some have argued that the first act of
intercourse should be considered "free" (gratuita) since prior to
consummation either party is free to enter religious life and neither
216. See id. at 605; C.27 q.2 c.6.
217. See X 3.32.7 (providing the text of Expublico).
218. See SUMMA INDUENT SANCTI, supra note 215, at 604.
219. See id.
220. See id. ("[E]t vis ista sine dolo fuit, et vis iusta dici potest, sicut vis a
magistratu....").
221. See id. at 605.
222. See id. ("Interim tamen nihilominus potest vir earn cognoscere suo iure,
etiam ea repugnante.").
223. See id. ("Petenti autem illa negare sine mortali peccato non potest nisi
parata sit statim monasterium intrare .... ").
224. See HOsTIENsIs, supra note 29, at X 3.32.7 v. vel ad virwn.
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has power over the other.225 Hostiensis rebutted this proposition. He
asserted that "the contrary is true," following this terse claim with
cross-references to three decretals that stood for the proposition that
it was the church's rerogative to enforce marriage contracts made in
the present tense. 22  Absent from Hostiensis's analysis is any sense
of the rough justice and self-help of the Summa induent sancti. But
his analysis still allowed the official weight of the church to be
brought to bear on the spouse who refused to consummate a marriage
and also refused to enter religious life.
It would be Thomas Aquinas who would return to the issue of
self-help presented so baldly by the Summa induent sancti, asking
whether the action countenanced in that text amounted to a species of
rape.227  Rape, as Thomas defined the term, was committed
whenever violence was used illicitly to deflower a virgin.228 What,
then, of a man betrothed to a girl? Does he commit the crime of rape
by forcibly consummating the union? Thomas answered in the
negative: He has a kind of right in the betrothed (aliquodjus in sua
sponsa).229 Hence, although he commits a sin by bringing violence
to bear against his betrothed, he is excused from the crime of rape.
230
Thomas did succeed in turning the tables on the author of the
Summa. No longer would the woman sin by resisting her attacker. It
was the attacker who sinned and put his immortal soul in jeopardy by
his violent sexual coercion. But the woman's ultimate remedy was
not in the criminal courts of the external forum, but before the throne
of God.
But if the notion of a right to the conjugal debt could
disadvantage the female party to a marriage prior to consummation,
this right might also be of advantage in other situations. In a
225. See id.
226. Id. The decretals Hostiensis cites include: X 4.1.10, which permits a
party to compel consummation by means of ecclesiastical censure; X 4.1.9,
which stands for the proposition that present-tense consent makes a marriage;
and X 4.1.22, which again recognizes the church's power to enforce a marriage
contract by ecclesiastical censure. See id.
227. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 2a 2ae q.154 art.7
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947).
228. See id. at 2a 2ae q.154 art.7 resp. ("Dicendum quod raptus .... quando
aliquis violentiam infert ad virginem illicite deflorandam.").
229. See id. at 2a 2ae q.154 art.7 resp.4.
230. See id. ("[E]t ideo quamvis peccet violentiam inferendo, excusatur
tamen a crimine raptus.").
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consummated marriage, the right to the conjugal debt was one of the
very few areas of equality between a husband and wife.23'
Theologians and canonists were agreed on this point. Thus the
theologian Peter Lombard wrote: "It should also be known that
although in all other respects the man is placed above the woman, at
her head, for 'the man is the head of the woman,' nevertheless in
satisfying the debt of the flesh they are equal. 232  Ganduf of
Bologna echoed this observation when he asked directly whether
man and wife were equal with respect to the conjugal debt and
answered in the affirmative.233 Citing to St. Paul and St. Ambrose,
Gandulf concluded that spouses are equal in demanding the conjugal
debt, even though he acknowledged that "in other matters the
husband is superior."
234
The canonists agreed with the sentiments of the theologians.
Echoing St. Paul, Hostiensis noted simply that such is the effect of a
consummated marriage, that a woman has no power over her body,
but her husband, and also the reverse.235 While in other respects, the
husband is to be obeyed, neither party may take an action, such as
changing one's status in life, or entering religious life, which has the
effect of damaging the other party's claim to the conjugal debt
without the other's consent.2 36 The conjugal debt, furthermore, was
permanent: a valid marriage gave rise to a sacramental bond which
is dissolvable only by death, and by no other occurrence, "such as
231. See generally James A. Brundage, Sexual Equality in Medieval Canon
Law, in MEDIEVAL WOMEN AND THE SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL HISTORY 66
(Joel T. Rosenthal ed., 1990) (discussing the evolution of medieval canonists'
opinions about the sexual equality of married men and women)....
232. LOMBARD, supra note 201, at Lib. 4, dist.332 ("Sciendum est etiam,
quia, cum in omnibus aliis vir praesit mulieri, ut caput corpori, est.enim 'vir
caput mulieris,' in solvendo tamen caris debito pares sunt.") (quoting I
Corinthians 11:3).
233. See GANDULF OF BOLOGNA, SENTENTIARUM LIBRI QUATUOR, Lib. 4 §
227 (Joannes de Walter ed., 1924).
234. See id. ("Sunt autem pares in carnali debito reddendo coniugati... 'In
aliis vero praeest vir.'").
235. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 146, at Lib. 4 De matrimonio § 21 ("Et
etiam est tantus effectus matrimonii consummati quod mulier non habet
potestatem sui corporis, sed vir, et econtra.").
236. See id. ("Unde nec alter altero invito potest vitam mutare nec ad
religionem convolare.").
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one party becoming a heretic, or becoming blind or leprous, or
encountering some other horrible thing.
23 7
This concern for the equality and permanence of the conjugal
debt would come to color much of thirteenth-century analysis of
marital relations. The protection and preservation of the equality of
the relationship established by the conjugal right-ius coniugale-
and the set of reciprocal claims and obligations thereby generated,
would become a principal foundation of canonistic analysis of the
entire marital relationship.
The ius coniugale might serve as a restraint on arbitrary action,
whether by public authority or by the other party to a marriage. The
decretalists were particularly fond of considering the interaction of
the feudal rights of lords with the marital rights of serfs.23 8 What if a
feudal lord demanded his serf s services at the same time the serf's
wife demanded satisfaction of the conjugal ius? This was an
especially intriguing question, because feudal lords had a right-
ius-in their serfs, as did the serfs' wives.
239
The decretalists gave conflicting answers to this question.
Bernard of Parma, balancing the interests of serfs and their feudal
overlords, was willing to give priority to the claims of the serf s
wife. 240 The serf-husband called upon by his lord, Bernard argued,
should ordinarily first be allowed to satisfy his wife, since the lord
would be only minimally inconvenienced by such a delay.
24'
Innocent IV, on the other hand, sided with the lord, citing to Roman
law for the proposition that the lord's demands should be given
237. Id. at § 20 ("Item effectus est ut ex quo tenuit inter fideles semel
contractun matrimonium nullatneus dissolvatur, nisi per mortem que omnia
solvit... etiam si alter coniugum efficiatur hereticus, vel cecus vel leprosus,
vel aliquid aliud horrendum incurrat quantumque sit.").
238. See Reid, supra note 18, at 88-91.
239. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 29, at X 4.9.1 v. sacramentis. The balance
between the rights of the serf and the serf's family, on the one hand, and the
rights of the feudal lord, on the other, was a recurrent one in both decretist and
decretalist commentary. See Peter Landau, Hadrians IV. Dekretale "Dignum
Est" (X 4.9.1.) Und Die Eheschliessung Unfreier in der Diskussion von
Kanonisten und Theologen des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts [Hadrian IV's
Decretal 'Dignum Est" (X 4.9.1.) and the Marital Formation of the Unfree in
the Writings of the Canonists and Theologians of the Twelfth and Thirteenth
Centuries], 12 STUDIA GRATIANA 511, 535-46 (1967).
240. See BERNARD OF PARMA, supra note 105, at X 4.9.1 v. servitia.
241. Id.; see also Reid, supra note 18, at 89 (analyzing Bernard of Parma's
argument).
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priority, unless delay raised the danger of the wife committing
adultery.
242
Hostiensis subsequently rejected Innocent's arguments. There
are some, Hostiensis observed, who argue the feudal obligation is
prior in time and should be given priority over the marital rights of a
243serf's wife. But, Hostiensis continued, where there is danger of
fornication it is clear that God's law and the teaching of St. Paul
should be given priority.
2 44
Raymond of Pefiafort provided the most detailed response to this
dilemma. Where the lord has consented to a servile marriage,
Raymond argued, he should be presumed to have consented to the
conjugal rights that are a part of marriage. 24 5 But where the marriage
took place against the lord's wishes, or without his knowledge, the
lord's orders should ordinarily receive priority.246
The particulars of this analysis are not as significant as the
decretalists' effort to reach a compromise between two conflicting
sets of rights: those of a feudal lord to his customary services, and
those of a wife expecting her husband to act in conformity to the
teaching of St. Paul's letter.
One sees this sort of analysis repeated in the area of the
renunciation of the marital right. Neither husband nor wife was free
to separate from his or her spouse, or to renounce the conjugal right
247without permission of the other. Two decretals of Pope Innocent
III's, Veniens and Accedens, established that renunciations of the
marital right could not be the result of force, fear, or fraud.248 In
both of these decretals, husbands engaged in extreme acts and
threats-in Veniens, the husband threatened that he would castrate
himself, while in Accedens, the husband beat his wife and threatened
her with physical harm-in order to obtain the permission of their
spouses to enter religious life.249 When the two men encountered
difficulty with their new vocations, it was determined that they had
effectively renounced their marital rights but that their spouses, so
242. See INNOCENT IV, supra note 108, at X 4.9.1 v. servitia.
243. See HOSTIENsis, supra note 29, at X 4.1.9 v. exhiberi.
244. See id.
245. See RAYMOND OF PE1&AFORT, supra note 111, at 928.
246. See id.
247. See Reid, supra note 18, at 83-85.
248. See X 3.32.16 (Veniens); X 3.32.9 (Accedens).
249. See id.
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long as their conduct had been blameless, might be restored to their
rights.25 ° One might freely renounce one's own right, the decretalists
reasoned, but one could not be deprived of one's right without fault
(sine Culpa).
251
The limits of the decretalists' solicitude for the protection of the
rights of innocent third parties was tested by the case of a spouse
who contracted leprosy. Leprosy was a dreaded and fearful disease
in thirteenth-century Europe, chiefly affecting rural areas and
extending north into Scandinavia.u52 Without hope of cure, lepers
were to be segregated from the larger society, sometimes living in
isolated encampments, sometimes housed in leprosariums that came,
to be established in the larger dioceses of western Europe during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.2 53 A comprehensive set of rules
grew up to effectuate this separation.
254
Marriage represented a conceptual problem for this policy of
isolation. Spouses, after all, pledged themselves to a lifelong
community of life with one another, and they were not to lose their
250. See id. The wife in Veniens was denied restoration of her rights
because she had taken a number of lovers (amatores) during her husband's
absence, but the wife in Accedens was restored to her full marital rights
because of her blameless conduct. See id.; see also Reid, supra note 18, at 83-
85 (recognizing decretalists basic principle that "no one was to lose his or her
rights through no fault of her own.").
251. See Reid, supra note 18, at 83-85.
252. See PETER RICHARDS, THE MEDIEVAL LEPER AND HIS NORTHERN
HEIRS 3-12 (1977); see also Ann G. Carmichael, Leprosy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
WORLD HISTORY OF HUMAN DISEASE 834, 834 (Kenneth F. Kiple ed., 1993)
(stating that leprosy likely extended as far north as the Arctic Circle).
253. See FRAN(oIS-OLIvIER TOUATI, MALADIE ET SOCItTE AU MOYEN AGE:
LA LPRE, LES LPREUX, ET LES LPROSARIES DANS LA PROVINCE
ECCLtSIASTICQUE DE SENS JUSQU'AU MILIEU DU XIV SICLE [DISEASE AND
SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE AGES: LEPROSY, LEPERS, AND LEPRORIUMS IN THE
ECCLESIASTICAL PROVINCE OF SENS AROUND THE MIDDLE OF THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY] 247-307 (1998). Isolation of lepers has remained part
of public health policy even in modem America. See Peter Applebome,
Leprosy Patients Recall a Pain Beyond Disease, N.Y. TIES, Mar. 27, 1989, at
A14; Rick Bragg, Lives Stolen by Treatment, Not by Disease: The Last Lepers,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1995, at Al; Sandeep Jauhar, Both Home and Prison,
Leprosy Site May Shut, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1998, at F4.
254. See generally E. JEANSELME, COMMENT L'EUROPE AU MOYEN AGE: SE
PROTtGEA CONTRE LA LEPRE [How EUROPE PROTECTED ITSELF AGAINST
LEPROSY IN THE MIDDLE AGES] (1931) (examining the development of rules
governing the segregation of lepers from Western society).
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marital rights through no fault of their own.255 Two decretals of
Pope Alexander III commanded healthy spouses to remain with their
ill companions, and to minister to them with "marital affection."
25 6
The decretalists considered the extent to which the healthy partner
was to render to the ill spouse the conjugal right. Bernard of Parma
argued that the healthy spouse need not share the same living
arrangements as the ill spouse and that the ill spouse should not be
"overly wicked" in demanding the conjugal right. 7 But where the
ill spouse demanded satisfaction of the debt, it could not be denied,
since this would be to defraud the ill spouse of his or her right
without fault.
258
Innocent IV, for his part, distanced himself from those who
rigidly required fulfillment of the conjugal debt: others say that the
parties are to be strictly compelled to render the debt, Innocent noted,
but, he maintained, out of kindness (de benignitate), something else
might be tolerated.259
Hostiensis, finally, staked out a position that recognized at once
the sanctity of the right at stake but that also tempered rigidity with a
sense of compassion for the difficult situation created by a diagnosis
of leprosy. Marriage, Hostiensis began, was instituted by God to
make two persons into one flesh, and Scripture permitted separation
only in cases of adultery.260 Hostiensis noted that by the terms of
Pope Alexander's decretals, the healthy spouse was obliged to render
the conjugal debt when it was demanded. 26' He acknowledged that
while it would be a mortal sin to refuse to render the debt when it
was demanded, he also declined to apply the ecclesiastical penalty of
excommunication to such cases: the healthy party might simply find
the level of revulsion too great to render the debt, and he or she
should not be obliged to do the impossible.
262
255. See Reid, supra note 18, at 86-88.
256. See X 4.8.1; X 4.8.2; see also John T. Noonan, Jr., MaritalAffection in
the Canonists, 12 STUDIA GRATIANA 481, 489-509 (1967) (commenting on the
importance of marital affection to canonistic thought on marriage); Reid, supra
note 18, at 86-87 (analyzing these decretals).
257. See BERNARD OF PARMA, supra note 105, at X 4.8.1 v. ministrent.
258. See id.
259. See INNOCENT IV, supra note 108, at X 4.8.1 v. potuerunt.
260. See HOSTIENSIS, supra note 29, at X 4.8.1 v. una caro.
261. See id. at X 4.8.1 v. ministrent.
262. See id.
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This analysis illustrates the powerful hold claims of right have
on the legal imagination. The violence of a forcible consummation
was nearly completely masked by the invocation of rights language
in a work like the Summa induent sancti.263 Even Thomas Aquinas,
who was willing to analyze forcible marital intercourse under the
rubric of rape and to condemn transgressors as sinners, concluded
that a husband's forcible intercourse with his newly wed bride did
not amount to the crime of rape, because he had some right to take
this action.26
On the other hand, claims of right could insulate married
women, as well as men, from the worst depredations of feudal life.
The marital rights of female serfs were to be protected. Women and
men were to be safeguarded from arbitrary renunciations of marital
rights. And in an extreme case, a spouse with leprosy was to be
protected in her or his marital right. The marital right was not to
cease even with the onset of the most feared disease of the age.
265
V. CONCLUSION
The ius mulierum, as Hostiensis pointedly observed, was in most
circumstances of lesser condition than the right of men. Yet
Hostiensis conceded there were areas where this right might be equal
to or even stronger than male rights. This Article has explored three
areas where an equality of rights prevailed between men and
women-the right to select one's place of burial, the right to contract
marriage freely, and the right to exact the conjugal debt. In fact, the
popes, canonists, and theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries were greatly innovative in recognizing these areas of
equality. As was seen in the case of women's burial rights, a
powerful tradition sometimes had to be repudiated before equality of
choice could come into being. And as evidenced by Margery Paston,
once these spheres of freedom were brought into being, women, as
well as men, were free to exercise their power of choice.
The use of rights language to define these three areas of personal
choice at times gave rise to a formal equality that was betrayed by
the reality of human interaction. This is most clearly seen in the case
263. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 227, at 2a 2ae q. 154 art.7 resp.4.
264. See supra notes 227-30 (reviewing Thomas's arguments).
265. See supra notes 238-62 (reviewing the conjugal right in the context of
feudal relations and leprosy).
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of the right to consummate a marriage. Theoretically, it would seem
that men, as well as women enjoyed this right, but in practice, as
even the canonists and theologians acknowledged, it was a right
claimable by men alone. Even Thomas Aquinas, who analyzed
forcible consummation under the rubric of rape, could not bring
himself to see this action as a crime, even though it amounted to a
sinful use of one's right.
At other times, however, reliance on rights language served to
protect the interests of the vulnerable party in the marital
relationship. Thus, the canonists expended considerable efforts in
protecting the rights of women in feudal marriages, and the rights of
the ill spouse, where one or the other party had contracted leprosy.
Marriage created a sacred bond which gave rise to certain rights
which no human authority could arbitrarily violate.
From a distance of seven hundred years, these debates remain
valuable for the patterns of thought they laid down. In narrowly
drawn circumstances, the relationship of men and women might be
analyzed by recourse to their rights. While wives remained generally
subject to their husbands throughout the middle ages, certain areas of
equality were carved out, which the law stood ready to enforce. The
principles thereby articulated, however, were capable of expansion
and generalization, and persist to our own day.
